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A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE 
IMPACT OF EXPERIMENTAL USE 
EXEMPTIONS IN PATENT LAW ON 
INCENTIVES TO INNOVATE 
KEVIN ILES∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
¶1 The patent laws of most leading pharmaceutical manufacturing nations contain 
provisions known colloquially as “research exemptions” or “experimental use 
exemptions.”  The way in which the exemption is formulated has a direct bearing on 
research and development (R&D) in each nation and is intimately linked to one of the 
major jurisprudential rationales underpinning patent law, namely, the incentive to 
innovate theory. 
¶2 In the absence of patent harmonization, different nations have divergent 
formulations of the research exemption based on their domestic policy decisions as to the 
best means of striking the balance between encouraging innovation and protecting 
patents.1  Because of the close relationship between the research exemption and R&D, it 
can be anticipated that the formulation of a research exemption will determine a nation’s 
competitive advantage relative to other nations with respect to R&D.  For example, 
assume that Ruritania (an imaginary country) has a narrow experimental use exemption.  
Because of the territorial character of intellectual property law, the Ruritanian inventor 
will receive patent protection only in the countries in which she filed for a patent.  
However, even when the Ruritanian inventor has secured patent protection abroad, if 
foreign countries have broader experimental use exemptions in their patent law than 
Ruritania does, foreign innovators will have greater scope to engage in innovative 
activity on Ruritanian goods under the protection of their countries’ research exemptions 
than Ruritanian innovators will be entitled to engage in on foreign patented goods in 
Ruritania.  This would seem to place Ruritania at a competitive disadvantage relative to 
other nations. 
 
∗ BSc(Hons) LLB, University of Cape Town; LLM, Duke University School of Law; Candidate attorney, 
Bowman Gilfillan Inc., South Africa.  This paper was written in partial fulfillment of the requirements for 
the LLM degree at Duke University School of Law.  I am extremely grateful to the Ismail Mahomed 
Fellowship administered by the Constitutional Court Trust of the South African Constitutional Court which 
provided funding for my LLM studies at Duke.  Additional funding was provided by a University of Cape 
Town exchange scholarship, a Kramer Law School grant from the University of Cape Town and the 
Manuel and Luby Washkansky Scholarship from the University of Cape Town.  My grateful thanks to Ken 
Sibley for his assistance and guidance in the writing of this paper.  In undertaking this study I have used 
English translations of all materials cited.  Foreign cases, where these were not available in English, have 
been cited to the sources discussing them. 
1 See John A. Tessensohn, Reversal of Fortune–Pharmaceutical Experimental Use and Patent 
Infringement in Japan, 4 J. INT’L LEGAL STUD. 1, 50-51 (1998). 
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¶3 In addition, there is nothing to prevent an innovator from experimenting on or with 
a patented invention in a country with broad experimental use provisions and then 
patenting the resultant product in a country with narrow experimental use provisions, so 
as to maximise the profit of that invention. Thus, while a broad experimental use 
provision might affect the number of patents filed in a particular country, the effect on 
R&D may be more subtle. 
¶4 Research exemption literature lacks any empirical assessments of the impact of 
research exemptions on domestic R&D.  Given the intimate relationship between 
competitive advantage and the research exemption, it will be necessary to have a more 
detailed understanding of the relationship between price control, patent term extension 
schemes and the research exemption, and how these factors influence domestic R&D. 
¶5 While comparative analyses of research exemptions have been undertaken,2 there is 
little, if any, literature on the competitive effect of experimental use exemptions.  Nor is 
there an examination of the rationales or jurisprudential bases that underlie the 
experimental use and research exemptions in national laws.  For patent harmonization in 
the area of research exemptions to be achieved, it will be necessary to have an agreed 
upon understanding of the scope and operation of the exemption. 
¶6 This paper undertakes a comparative analysis of the experimental use exemptions 
of four leading pharmaceutical manufacturing nations—the United States (US), the 
United Kingdom (UK), Germany and Japan3—with a view to understanding the 
jurisprudential rationales underlying each country’s formulation of the exemption.  Some 
steps are also taken towards examining the empirical impact of each country’s research 
exemption on research and development in that nation. 
¶7 The paper begins with an exploration of the “incentive to innovate” theory 
underlying patent law in Part I and examines the various hypotheses concerning the 
impact of experimental use exemptions on research and development.  Special attention 
is given to pharmaceuticals and research tools.  Parts II through V contain an analysis of 
the law in the US, Japan, the UK and Germany.  In Part VI, the four formulations of the 
research exemption are analyzed in light of patent law jurisprudence and the 
jurisprudential rationales of research exemptions highlighted in Part I.  Part VII contains 
a preliminary examination of the empirical impact of research exemptions on a nation’s 
research and development. 
¶8 Finally, Part VIII shows that carving out limited and narrow exemptions does not 
necessarily curtail the research and development of a nation or hamper university 
research.  It is also shown that research tools are distinguished from other inventions 
under the UK and German experimental use exemptions in a jurisprudentially sound way. 
The US alone bases its experimental use test on a commercial rationale.  This test fails to 
sufficiently account for the economic and practical realities of modern research. 
 
2 See Natalie M. Derzko, A Local and Comparative Analysis of the Experimental Use Exception – Is 
Harmonization Appropriate?, 44 IDEA 1 (2003). 
3 See generally Kevin Sandstrom, How Much Do We Value Research and Development?: Broadening 
the Experimental Use Exemption to Patent Infringement in Light of Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck 
KGaA, 331 F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir. 2003), 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1059 (2004); Tessensohn, supra note 1, 
at 50; Jennifer A. Johnson, The Experimental Use Exception in Japan: A Model for US Patent Law?, 12 
PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 499, 500 (2003). 
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A. Incentive to Innovate 
¶9 Patent law is premised on the theory that conferring an artificial and limited 
monopoly on a patent holder benefits society in two ways: first, by requiring disclosure 
of the invention as a requirement for obtaining a patent, and second, by encouraging 
inventors to bring their inventions to the market because of the lead time the monopoly 
grants them in which to profit from their inventions.4  However, a free-rider problem 
arises when nations benefit from access to publicly disclosed patented inventions without 
protecting patentable subject matter themselves.  Partially to combat this difficulty, the 
Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Agreement (TRIPS) was passed and 
became a requirement for membership to the World Trade Organization.5  TRIPS 
requires member states to enact certain minimum standards of intellectual property 
protection.  TRIPS also provides the patent holder with certain rights6 over her patented 
good for a period of twenty years in the territory in which the patent is granted.7  The 
rights granted to a patent holder under TRIPS include the exclusive rights to make, sell 
and import the manufactured invention.8  Unauthorized infringement of these is an 
actionable infringement of the patentee’s rights in the country where the patent is held.9 
¶10 The “incentive to innovate” theory of patent law is premised on the assumption that 
the grant of a patent monopoly is necessary to enable an inventor to recoup the costs of 
the R&D needed to bring the invention to market.  Without an ability to recoup R&D 
costs, there would be no incentive to engage in R&D at all.  Recouping R&D costs must, 
however, be distinguished from the control of follow-on innovation by a patent holder, 
which is an incidental effect of the patent system and which inhibits R&D.10 
¶11 As part of the patent “bargain,” the patent holder must disclose the specifications of 
their work such that a person skilled in the art11 can make and use the invention, and 
develop improvements and inventions based on, or emerging from, the technology 
employed in the patented invention.12  Allowing experiments on patented inventions is 
important for further innovation and development.13  The degree and extent of disclosure 
required by the patent law, and the scope and duration of the exclusive rights granted to 
the patent holder, determines the degree to which follow-on innovation is stimulated or 
 
4 See Katherine J. Strandburg, What Does the Public Get? Experimental Use and the Patent Bargain, 
WIS. L. REV. 81 (2004); Lara J. Glasgow,  Stretching the Limits of Intellectual Property Rights: Has the 
Pharmaceutical Industry Gone Too Far?, 41 IDEA 227, 228-29 (2001); Advisory Council on Intellectual 
Property, Australia (ACIP), Patents and Experimental Use Options Paper 18 (Dec. 2004), 
http://www.acip.gov.au/library/Experimental%20Use%20Options%20Paper%20A.pdf; Johnson, supra 
note 3, at 500. 
5 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, including Trade in Counterfeit 
Goods (TRIPS), Apr. 15, 1994, Appendix 1C to the Agreement Amending the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade and Creating the World Trade Organization, signed by GATT members. 
6 Id., § 5. 
7 Id. art. 33. 
8 Id. art. 26, 28. 
9 Id. art. 41. 
10 See Strandburg, supra note 4, at 88; ACIP, supra note 4, at 23. 
11 The phrase “skilled in the art” is a common technical phrase used in the patent laws of most nations to 
describe a person with knowledge, expertise and skill in the area of technology to which the patent refers. 
12 See Strandburg, supra note 4, at 100-04. 
13 See id. at 101, 106. 
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inhibited.14  However, because patent-holders prefer to maximize their own economic 
returns, there is no incentive to license other innovators, to design around the invention or 
to develop follow-up inventions.15 
¶12 For this reason, TRIPS provides certain exceptions to the exclusive rights of patent 
holders,16 and most leading statutory patent regimes contain comparable experimental use 
or research exemptions.17  The scope varies in each country, but essentially the 
exemption provides a limited defence for follow-on innovators who have engaged in 
certain permitted uses or experiments with patented goods.18  These provisions prevent 
patent-holders from blocking the introduction of follow-on innovations until the 
expiration of the patent (or unless compensation is paid to the patent-holder under a 
compulsory licence)19 and are thought to encourage domestic research and 
development.20 
¶13 Some commentators contend that narrow experimental use exemptions inhibit 
R&D by discouraging innovators from improving patented inventions and by restricting 
access to state-of-the-art technologies and research tools without the prior payment of a 
fee.21  On the other hand, a broad research exemption may discourage R&D by allowing 
innovators to design around inventions and develop competing technologies, thus 
reducing the ability of patent holders to recover returns on their investments.22 
¶14 Strandburg demonstrates that a distinction must be drawn between self-disclosing 
inventions (inventions which are easily reverse-engineered, such as pharmaceuticals and 
most product patents) and non-self-disclosing inventions (inventions where the R&D 
investment can be recouped through trade secret protection, such as many process 
 
14 See id. at 119. 
15 See id. at 102. 
16 TRIPS art. 31. 
17 See Janice M. Mueller, The Evanescent Experimental Use Exemption from United States Patent 
Infringement Liability: Implications for University and Nonprofit Research and Development, 56 BAYLOR 
L. REV. 917, 918 (2004).  For some justifications for experimental use not constituting infringement, see 
ACIP, supra note 4, at 24. 
18 See ACIP, supra note 4, at 24. 
19 See Strandburg, supra note 4, at 82.  The economic reality is such that a practical research exemption 
probably operates in most nations which is broader than any legal exemption.  This results from the fact 
that an infringement action is not likely to be brought against the non-commercial user of a patented 
invention.  See ACIP, supra note 4, at 36. 
20 Strandburg, supra note 4, at 83. 
21 See Mueller, supra note 17, at 919.  See generally Sandstrom, supra note 3; David C. Hoffman, A 
Modest Proposal: Toward Improved Access to Biotechnology Research Tools by Implementing a Broad 
Experimental Use Exception,  89 CORNELL L. REV. 993 (2004); David Cyranoski, This Protein Belongs 
To. . ., 426 NATURE 10 (Nov. 6, 2003); Maureen A. O’Rourke, Toward a Doctrine of Fair Use in Patent 
Law, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1177 (2000); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: 
Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017 (1989).  For a summary of the 
experimental use debate, see John R. Thomas, Scientific Research and the Experimental Use Privilege in 
Patent Law, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, Library of Congress, Order Code RL 
32651, at 9-13 (2004). 
22 See Strandburg, supra note 4, at 82; Jordan P. Karp, Experimental Use as Patent Infringement: The 
Impropriety of a Broad Exception, 100 YALE L.J. 2169 (1991) (advocating the use of compulsory licensing 
which will allow the researcher or inventor to still claim a royalty for their research efforts while not 
hindering future innovation.).  For a similar proposal relating to research tools, see Strandburg, supra note 
4, at 82. 
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patents).23  Patenting a non-self-disclosing invention is a public good as the disclosure 
requirement gives the public technological know-how.24  But, because non-self-
disclosing inventions can be protected through trade secret protection, they will only be 
patented (and therefore also disclosed) where the economic returns from the patent 
monopoly are greater than the gains provided by trade secret protection alone.25  If trade 
secret protection alone would enable the inventor to recoup their R&D costs, patenting in 
these circumstances would give the patent holder an economic gain beyond the mere 
recouping of R&D costs.26 
¶15 If the patent system is designed to benefit society as a whole through the fuelling of 
R&D and technological development rather than the individual patent-holder,27 it is fair 
to ask what benefit society gains in exchange for the economic boon gained by the 
patent-holder of a non-self-disclosing invention.  The benefit in this situation is the 
opportunity to compete with the patentee in a follow-on innovation contest on an 
invention that otherwise would not have been disclosed.  In effect, experimental use 
amounts to a broadened disclosure requirement on the patentee in exchange for a patent 
monopoly. 
¶16 For self-disclosing inventions, disclosure is implicit in bringing the product to 
market.28  The public good lies in the fact that without the benefit of patent protection the 
inventor has no incentive to bring the product to market at all.  Self-disclosing products 
can be instantly copied because they carry their inventiveness on their face.  Without the 
benefit of the lead time that a patent grants, inventors would not be able to recover R&D 
costs.29 
¶17 Strandburg’s distinction between self-disclosing and non-self-disclosing inventions 
demonstrates that the research exemption is necessary for non-self-disclosing inventions, 
such as process patents, in order to compensate society for the patentee’s extra economic 
gain.30  However, in the case of product and pharmaceutical patents, Strandburg’s 
analysis shows that the public has already received its benefit in being granted market 
access to the invention.31 
B. The special case of pharmaceuticals 
¶18 Given Strandburg’s analysis, it is interesting that research exemptions have 
primarily been implemented to benefit the generic pharmaceutical industry.  
Pharmaceuticals, in Strandburg’s analysis, are self-disclosing inventions.32  They are only 
brought to market because of the patent regime, and the public benefit gained from the 
patent is market access to the product.  No additional public benefit is therefore required.  
 
23 Strandburg, supra note 4, at 83. 
24 Id. at 105-106. 
25 Id. at 111. 
26 Id. at 112-113. 
27 Id. at 90-91. 
28 Strandburg, supra note 4, at 105-07. 
29 Id. at 104-05. 
30 Id. at 104-08. 
31 Id. at 104-05. 
32 Id. at 105. 
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Narrowing the patentee’s rights by the creation of a research exemption in the field of 
pharmaceuticals therefore would appear to tip the balance unevenly in the public’s favor. 
¶19 The R&D costs for pharmaceuticals are exceptionally high.33  However, because 
medicines are necessary for public health, a balance needs to be struck between 
maintaining the revenue stream of pharmaceutical companies to ensure further R&D and 
providing medicines to the public at an affordable price. 
¶20 Price regulation, compulsory licensing and research exemptions have been used to 
foster this balance and encourage generic competition.  Generic drugs have an enormous 
impact on the price of brand name medicines.34  In many countries, generic 
manufacturers are permitted to conduct certain preparatory work on patented drugs so as 
to obtain market approval for the generic medicines prior to the expiration of the patent 
on the brand name drug.  This ensures that once the patent on the brand name drug 
expires, there is no undue delay and de facto extension of the brand name drug’s 
monopoly while the generic drug manufacturer goes through the regulatory approval 
process.  This exemption for generic drug manufacturers can either form a part of a 
broader experimental use exemption or can be contained in an industry specific 
experimental use exemption.35 
C. The special case of the research tool 
¶21 The research tool is an invention primarily intended to be used as a tool in 
performing research.36  Some commentators have expressed concern that patents on 
research tools, especially biotechnology research tools, can impede future research by 
creating “patent-thickets” and preventing researchers from performing experiments that 
rely on patented tools without authorization and royalty payments.37  However, it is 
rational for the patent-holder of a research tool to encourage researchers to use that tool 
since that is where the patent holder’s profit is to be made.38  She is therefore unlikely to 
make the use of that tool burdensome through high prices or the withholding of 
authorization.39 
¶22 Patents on research tools have a direct effect on universities and other primary 
research institutions.40  Mueller cites studies that show that in order to navigate through 
 
33 See Glasgow, supra note 4, at 231; Tessensohn, supra note 1, at 22-23. 
34 See Glasgow, supra note 4, at 232. 
35 Drug compounds are typically patented fairly early in the drug development process.  Because of the 
length of time taken to obtain marketing approval for a new drug, the effective patent term on a patented 
brand name drug is typically substantially shorter than the minimum 20 years given to all patented 
products.  To compensate for this time loss, nations that have generic drug exemptions typically also 
provide for patent term extensions on the brand name drug to partially compensate for the time lost to 
regulatory approval. 
36 See Strandburg, supra note 4, at 121. 
37 See Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in 
Biomedical Research, 280 SCI. 698 (May 1, 1998); Strandburg, supra note 4, at 124-30. 
38 Strandburg, supra note 4, at 124-30. 
39 See Heather Hamme Ramirez, Defending the Privatization of Research Tools: An Examination of the 
‘Tragedy of the Anticommons’ in Biotechnology Research and Development, 53 EMORY L.J. 359, 362 
(2004); F. Scott Kieff, Facilitating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of 
Science – A Response to Rai and Eisenberg, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 691 (2001). 
40 E.g., Mueller, supra note 17, at 944-45. 
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growing patent thickets and obtain licenses to use research tools covered by corporate-
owned patents, universities are required to divert limited resources and sign contracts 
mandating reporting requirements, improvement assignments and the payment of reach-
through royalties.41  However, other studies report that while the preconditions for a 
breakdown of downstream research are present, there remains no detectable anti-
commons effect.42  Some commentators also argue that because university-based 
researchers typically do not harness the patent system as private sector researchers do, a 
research exemption should be crafted to cover them.43  However, university research is 
not isolated from private sector commercial implications and is increasingly benefiting 
from the patent system.44 
II. THE EXPERIMENTAL USE EXEMPTION IN U.S. LAW 
A. Common law exemption 
¶23 The US has no general statutory research exemption, only a narrow judicially 
crafted common law exemption45 which dates back to 1813.46  In stating the exemption, 
Justice Story held that to infringe a patent holder’s exclusive right of use, the alleged 
infringer had to intend to profit from that use.  Justice Story held that the legislature could 
never have intended to include within the meaning of the word “use” in the patent law 
those persons who used the invention “merely for philosophical experiments” or to 
ascertain “the sufficiency of the machine to produce its described effects.”47  By 1861 it 
was “well-settled that an experiment with a patented article for the sole purpose of 
gratifying a philosophical taste, or curiosity, or for mere amusement is not an 
infringement.”48 
¶24 In Roche Products Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co.49 the appellant (Roche) sought 
to enjoin the appellee (Bolar) from taking, during the life of the appellant’s patent, the 
statutory and regulatory steps necessary to market a generic drug equivalent to the 
appellant’s patented drug after the expiration of the appellant’s patent.50  The appellee 
conceded that its use of the appellant’s patented chemical did not fall within the 
 
41 Id. 
42 See ACIP, supra note 4, at 37. 
43 E.g., John P. Walsh, Ashish Arora, & Wesley M. Cohen, Working Through the Patent Problem, 299 
SCI. 1021, 1021 (Feb. 14, 2003). 
44 See Thomas, supra note 21, at 10; Traci Dreher Quigley, Commercialization of the State University: 
Why the Intellectual Property Restoration Act of 2003 is Necessary, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 2001 (2004); 
ACIP, supra note 4, at 19; Mueller, supra note 17, at 946. 
45 See Janice M. Mueller, No ‘Dilettante Affair’: Rethinking the Experimental Use Exemption to Patent 
Infringement for Biomedical Research Tools, 76 WASH. L.REV.1 (2001); Mueller, supra note 17, at 927-30. 
46 See Thomas, supra note 21, at 1; Mueller, supra note 17, at 926-32; Strandburg, supra note 4, at 93-
100. 
47 See Strandburg, supra note 4, at 93-100 
48 Roche Prod. Inc. v. Bolar Pharm., 733 F.2d 858, 862 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (quoting Peppenhausen v. 
Falke, 19 F. Cas. 1048, 1049 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1862) (No. 11,279)), superseded by statute on other grounds, 
Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 872 F.2d 402, 404-05 (Fed. Cir. 1989). 
49 Id.; Mueller, supra note 17, at 932-34; Derzko, supra note 2, at 5-6. 
50 Roche, 733 F.2d at 860. 
N O RT H W ES T ERN  J O U RN A L O F  T ECH N O LO G Y  A N D  IN TE LL EC TU A L PRO P ER TY  [ 2 0 0 5  
 
68 
“traditional limits” of the common law experimental use doctrine.51  However, appellee 
argued that the experiments were true scientific enquiries in the literal sense to which the 
exception should logically extend.52  Still, the court found that Bolar’s use was solely for 
business reasons.53  The court held that the experimental use in this case had definite, 
cognizable, and not insubstantial commercial purposes.54 
¶25 In Embrex Inc. v. Service Engineering Corp.,55 the defendant had attempted to 
design around an existing patent.56  In doing so the defendant had used the patented 
invention in the course of its experiments.57  On a suit for infringement the court relied on 
Roche v. Bolar and held that the defendant’s use of the invention did not fall within the 
experimental use exception.58  The court held that the tests were being performed 
expressly for commercial purposes and were merely disguised as scientific inquiries, 
even though the defendant did not end up selling any of its intended machines.59 
¶26 In the most recent case, Madey v. Duke University,60 Duke University continued to 
use various items of research equipment owned and patented by the plaintiff after the 
plaintiff terminated his employment with the University.61  The University filed a motion 
for summary judgment on the infringement claim, arguing that its use of the patented 
inventions constituted non-commercial academic research and was therefore exempted 
from infringement liability by the experimental use exemption.62  Even though Duke 
University’s only purpose in continuing to use the patented equipment at issue was for 
educational purposes under government grants at a privately funded institution,63 the 
Court held that the exemption did not apply because Duke’s use of the equipment had 
“definite, cognisable, and not insubstantial commercial purposes.”64  After the holding in 
Madey, some commentators have argued that the exemption has become so narrow in 
scope65 as to only allow “uses done for amusement, to satisfy the idle curiosity or for 
strictly philosophical inquiry.”66 
 
51 Id. at 863. 
52 Id. at 862. 
53 Id. at 863. 
54 Id. 
55 216 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2000); see Mueller, supra note 17, at 934-35. 
56 See Embrex, 216 F.3d at 1346. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. at 1349. 
59 Id. 
60 266 F.2d 420 (M.D.N.C. 2001), reversed by Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002); 
see Mueller, supra note 17, at 936-47; Strandburg, supra note 4, at 81-100. 
61 See Madey, 266 F.2d at 422-23. 
62 Id. at 424. 
63 Id. at 427. 
64 Id. at 425 (quoting Roche, 733 F.2d at 863). 
65 See Michelle Cai, Madey v. Duke University: Shattering the Myth of Universities’ Experimental Use 
Defense, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 175 (2004). 
66 Mueller, supra note 17, at 942, 944. 
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B. Statutory exemption 
¶27 In response to the Roche v. Bolar decision67 Congress passed the Hatch-Waxman 
Act in 1984.68  Section 202 of that Act created an industry-specific research exemption 
known as the FDA exemption69 (or the “Bolar exemption”) for biomedical research 
undertaken to obtain governmental regulatory approval under the Federal Food, Drug and 
Cosmetic Act.  It was codified as 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) and states: 
It shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, offer to sell, or sell 
within the United States or import into the United States a patented 
invention (other than a new animal drug or veterinary biological 
product . . .) solely for uses reasonably related to the development and 
submission of information under a Federal law which regulates the 
manufacture, use, or sale of drugs or veterinary biological products.70 
¶28 This section was introduced to remedy the delayed market entry of generic drugs 
resulting from the inability of generic drug manufacturers to undertake the necessary 
FDA studies for regulatory approval prior to the expiration of the patent on the 
competitor drug product.71  The provision was intended to benefit generic medicine 
manufacturers and research-based pharmaceutical companies.72  Although the statutory 
exemption was passed with a limited and very specific purpose in mind (the correction of 
the pharmaceutical patent distortion),73 the language of the provision is broader than this 
narrow purpose.  This has led to some divergent results among the courts. 
¶29 Judicial interpretations of 271(e)(1) fall into two broad categories: those decisions 
concerned with the subject matter of 271(e)(1); and those concerned with the range of 
permissible activities under 271(e)(1).  The scope of subject matter falling within the 
phrase “patented invention” in the Bolar exemption was settled by the Supreme Court in 
Eli Lilly74 which held that “patented invention” in 271(e)(1) includes all categories of 
FDA regulated products.75 
 
67 See Roche, 733 F.2d at 862. 
68 Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 
(codified at 15 U.S.C. ss 68b-68c, 70b (1994); 21 U.S.C. §§ 301 note, 355, 360cc (1994); 28 U.S.C. § 2201 
(1994); 35 U.S.C. §§ 156, 271, 282 (1994)). 
69 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2000). 
70 Id. 
71 See, e.g., Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661 (1990); Intermedics, Inc. v. Ventitrex, Inc., 
775 F. Supp. 1269, 1272-73 (N.D. Cal. 1991); Integra Lifesciences, Inc. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 
865 (Fed. Cir. 2003), vacated by 125 S. Ct. 2372 (2005).  In exchange patent drug manufacturers obtained a 
patent restoration to correct for the loss of market time due to obtaining regulatory approval and various 
other non-patent exclusivity provisions. 
72 Glaxo, Inc. v. Novopharm Ltd., 110 F.3d 1562, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 98-
857(I), at 14-15 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2647-48). 
73 Integra, 331 F.3d at 866-67. 
74 Eli Lilly, 496 U.S. 661. 
75 Eli Lilly, 496 U.S. at 665; Abtox Inc. v. Exitron Corp., 122 F.3d 1019, 1027-29 (Fed. Cir. 1997).  
Derzko has criticized the expansion in Eli Lilly beyond what she terms the clear language specifying the 
applicability of 271(e)(1) to “drugs or veterinary biological products” citing economic reasons for a 
distinction between drugs and other inventions.  Derzko, supra note 2, at 10.  It is important to note, 
though, that the language of 271(e)(1) does not refer to drugs but rather to a “Federal Law which 
N O RT H W ES T ERN  J O U RN A L O F  T ECH N O LO G Y  A N D  IN TE LL EC TU A L PRO P ER TY  [ 2 0 0 5  
 
70 
¶30 The second aspect of 271(e)(1), the range of activities that the exemption permits, 
has prompted several interpretations because of the ambiguous statutory language.  The 
phrase “solely for uses reasonably related to” in 271(e)(1) can be interpreted in two 
possible ways: (1) the word “solely” can be used to limit the word “uses”; or (2) “solely” 
might limit the listed activities: “make, use, offer to sell or sell.” 
¶31 The difference in interpretation is of significant practical effect and emerges from 
the fact that any one activity can have multiple simultaneous purposes.  Suppose that 
inventor A has invented and patented the pharmacologically active compound P.  Then 
suppose that innovator B, without authorization from A, makes drug D, a drug with 
different medical indications to A’s drug, but which contains P.  The purpose of 
manufacturing D is to test the manufacturing process.  B also runs tests comparing P to D 
in order to determine the effectiveness of the manufacturing process.  B also sells the 
newly manufactured D for reasons unrelated to the regulatory approval process.  B has 
engaged in three distinct activities: making, using and selling.  Under interpretation (2) 
above, where “solely” qualifies the listed activities, any activity that has the generation of 
FDA-related data as a direct purpose will qualify under the exemption, even if there is 
some other non-FDA-related purpose also emerging from that activity.  Under 
interpretation (1) where “solely” qualifies “purposes,” any activity with a non-FDA-
related purpose will fail, even if the primary purpose of that activity is an FDA-related 
purpose. 
¶32 In the example above, the purpose of using P is to test the efficiency of the 
manufacturing process.  This is reasonably related to the FDA approval process.  Using P 
has no other purpose, and so under both interpretations the activity “using” will qualify 
for exemption.  The purpose of making is two-fold: the first purpose is to test the ability 
to manufacture D; the second is a long-term goal of making a commercial profit by 
eventually manufacturing and selling D.  Because the “making” activity has two 
purposes, one of which is non-FDA-related, it will pass under interpretation (2) but will 
fail under interpretation (1).  The third activity of selling is (for the purposes of this 
example) not related to FDA approval and would therefore fail under both approaches. 
¶33 One of the first reported decisions considering 271(e)(1) is Scripps v. Genentech,76 
a district court decision on a motion for summary judgment.77  In that case the court held 
that although the infringing use of the patent at issue might eventually lead to the 
submission of data to the FDA, the use was not solely for that purpose.78  It also had other 
non-FDA related uses and therefore failed to qualify under the exemption.79 
¶34 The next decision under the statute was Intermedics,80 also decided by the Court for 
the Northern District of California.  Between the Scripps decision and Intermedics, the 
Supreme Court decided the Eli Lilly case, which expanded the scope of exempted subject 
 
regulates . . . drugs.”  35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2000).  The Food and Drug Administration Act is undoubtedly 
such a law, and that Act incorporates other subject matter beyond drugs, something of which Congress was 
clearly aware as Justice Scalia points out in the Eli Lilly judgment.  Eli Lilly, 496 U.S. at 672-73. 
76 Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech Inc., 666 F. Supp. 1379 (N.D. Cal. 1986), rev’d on 
other grounds,  927 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
77 Id. 
78 Id. at 1396. 
79 Id. 
80 Intermedics, Inc. v. Ventitrex, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 1269 (N.D. Cal. 1991). 
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matter beyond drugs to all categories of FDA regulated goods.81  The Intermedics court 
interpreted the Eli Lilly judgment to mean that Congress was not concerned with the de 
facto length of the patent holder’s monopoly when it enacted 271(e)(1), but rather with 
ensuring that new medically beneficial cost-competitive drugs would reach the market 
upon expiration of existing patents.82  Because of this reading of the statute, the court 
reversed the approach it had taken in Scripps.  The court found that “the inquiry is not 
generally whether the allegedly infringing party has engaged in conduct that shows that it 
has purposes beyond generating and presenting data to the FDA.”83  Because the hope of 
profit or a business purpose underlies almost every use of a patented invention, the court 
was of the opinion that no use would ever be exempted under 271(e)(1) with the 
application of this test.84  The Intermedics court ultimately assessed the legality of the 
contested activities by asking whether it was objectively reasonable for the person 
invoking the exemption to believe that there was a decent prospect that the use in 
question would contribute relatively directly to the purposes permitted by 271(1)(e).85 
¶35 The difference between Scripps and Intermedics emerges from the two possible 
interpretations of 271(e)(1) offered above.  The Scripps court recognised that a single use 
of a patented invention may serve multiple purposes.  Instead of requiring all of those 
multiple purposes to relate to the generation of information for the FDA, it requires that 
for a use to be covered by the exemption the primary purpose of the use must be the 
generation of information for the FDA.86  In other words, the court adopted interpretation 
(2). 
¶36 In contrast, the Intermedics court assumed interpretation (1) applied.  As we have 
seen, the consequence of this reading is that any activity which has any purpose other 
than generating information for the FDA process will fail to qualify under the exemption 
even where one of the purposes is FDA-related.  To mitigate the consequences of this 
interpretation the Intermedics court held that uses that have commercial interests as their 
primary objective will qualify for the exemption where those activities also have at least a 
decent prospect of generating information for submission to the FDA.87  Instead of 
 
81 Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 665 (1990). 
82 Intermedics, 775 F. Supp. at 1273, 1277.  But cf. Glaxo, Inc. v. Novopharm Ltd., 110 F.3d 1562, 1568 
(Fed. Cir. 1997) (interpreting Eli Lilly as implying that Congress was concerned with providing a limited 
extension of patent holder’s monopoly rights in order to recover time lost during lengthy FDA review of 
drugs). 
83 Intermedics, 775 F. Supp. at 1278. 
84 Id. at 1279-80. 
85 Id. at 1280. 
86 Scripps employs the following set of steps to reach its result: (1) Assess each use that is made of the 
patented invention to determine whether that use is reasonably related to the generation of information for 
the FDA regulatory procedure; (2) Any uses which are so reasonably related will fall within the exemption; 
(3) Any use that is not so related will not fall within the exemption and will be infringing.  Integra 
Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 865-66 (Fed. Cir. 2003), vacated by 125 S. Ct. 2372 
(2005). 
87 The Intermedics approach is then followed in subsequent cases, including Telectronics Pacing Sys. 
Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc., 982 F.2d 1520, 1525 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 1992), Abtox Inc. v. Exitron Corp., 122 F.3d 
1019, 1027-29 (Fed. Cir. 1997), and Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc. 3 F. Supp. 2d 104, 108 
(D. Mass. 1998).  Derzko has criticized the Intermedics decision on other grounds. Derzko, supra note 2, at 
12-21. 
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adopting interpretation (2), the court effectively read the word “solely” out of the 
statute.88 
¶37 In the next case, Telectronics,89 the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals found that 
displaying an infringing invention at several medical conferences fell within the Bolar 
exemption because this activity was directed toward finding investigators who would be 
willing to conduct the necessary approval trials.90  Finding suitable investigators for the 
FDA process91 occurs after preliminary research takes place, but before the activities 
covered by the statutory exemption.  If the activities preparatory to the statutory 
exception are not covered, this would undermine the protection that Congress sought to 
confer on the generic drug manufacturer.92  The court found that while the primary 
purpose of the activity must be the generation of data for FDA purposes, the activity will 
not become infringing merely because that data is also put to other uses beyond the 
primary purpose.93 
¶38 Derzko criticises the Telectronics decision on the grounds that, like Intermedics, it 
effectively strikes the word “solely” out of the statute.94  Intermedics writes the word 
“solely” out of the statute by the creation of a commercial test in place of the statutory 
test.  Telectronics, however, does not.  In Telectronics, the court simply followed the 
Scripps interpretation, and read the provision as solely permitting activities that are 
reasonably FDA-related. 
¶39 Unlike the narrowing that has occurred with respect to the common law 
experimental use exemption, judicial interpretations of 271(e)(1) allow coverage of a 
broad range of activities under the exemption.95  The cause of this broadening does not lie 
in the “reasonably related” part of the statutory language to which Derzko has directed 
criticism, but rather in the courts’ findings about what is and what is not FDA-related.  
The range of supposedly FDA-related activities has been drawn too widely because of the 
substitution of a commercial purpose test in the Intermedics decision for interpretation (2) 
of the statute. 
¶40 The other cause of this over-breadth in determining the range of ostensibly FDA-
related activities emerges from the judicial preference for an objective evaluation of the 
purpose of an activity over a subjective assessment.96  Not only does determining the 
purpose of an otherwise infringing activity in a vacuum unnecessarily broaden the statute, 
but it allows activities which objectively bear a relationship to the generation of FDA-
related data to pass under the statute even where the parties concerned had no intention of 
using the data generated for FDA purposes.  For example, in Abtox the court of appeals 
 
88 Derzko, supra note 2, at 19. 
89 Telectronics, 982 F.2d 1520. 
90 Id. at 1523. 
91 Accepting the Court’s factual determination as to the purpose of those activities. 
92 This was a concern raised by Judge Newman in a dissenting judgment in Integra.  Integra 
Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 872-73 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (Newman, J., dissenting), 
vacated by 125 S. Ct. 2372 (2005). 
93 Telectronics, 982 F.2d at 1524.  Here again, this argument is made accepting the Court’s factual 
findings at face value although issue can probably be taken with what the primary purposes of the activities 
in issue were. 
94 Derzko, supra note 2, at 16. 
95 Id. at 25. 
96 See id. at 18; Intermedics, Inc. v. Ventitrex, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 1269, 1274-1275 (N.D. Cal. 1991). 
Vol. 4:1] Kevin Iles 
  73 
held that certain otherwise infringing uses of a patented drug were covered by the 
exemption even though on the evidence the use was plainly for the purpose of obtaining 
patent approval abroad rather than for FDA approval.97  The court held that the use fell 
within the exemption because, viewed objectively, there was a reasonable prospect that 
these uses could give rise to information that might be useful to FDA-approval.98 
¶41 The latest decision by the court of appeals appears to endorse Scripps, Telectronics 
and interpretation (2) of 271(e)(1).  In Integra Lifesciences v. Merck,99 the Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that any infringing use of an invention must be for a 
purpose that is reasonably related to the purpose specified in 271(e)(1).  No other uses are 
permissible.100  The court held that: 
Activities that do not directly produce information for the FDA are already 
straining the relationship to the central purpose of the safe harbor. The 
term ‘reasonably’ permits some activities that are not themselves the 
experiments that produce FDA information to qualify as ‘solely for uses 
reasonably related’ to clinical tests for the FDA. Again, however, the 
statutory language limits the reach of that relationship test.101  
¶42 In this case, Merck had infringed Integra’s patent by using Integra’s patented 
peptide sequence in tests aimed at identifying a suitable drug candidate for a 
pharmaceutical compound.102  According to the court, this was a purpose in which the 
FDA had no interest.103  The court’s view of 271(e)(1) was that it was designed to cover 
only those activities that contribute relatively directly to information that the FDA 
considers in granting approval to a drug already on the market.104  The court was very 
concerned that the patent infringement should be kept at de minimus levels and that not 
all drug development activities should be brought within the exemption.105  Although the 
court makes no mention of the Intermedics decision, Integra appears to over-rule it by 
implication. 
¶43 In a dissent, Judge Newman agreed with the majority that 271(e)(1) cannot reach 
back to cover the identification and development of new drugs.106  However, Judge 
Newman found that Merck’s activities fell within the permissible bounds of the common 
law experimental use exemption.107  Judge Newman reasoned that the common law 
exemption exists in order to advance R&D by allowing inventors to experiment with 
 
97 Abtox Inc. v. Exitron Corp., 122 F.3d 1019, 1029-30 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
98 Id.  See also NeoRX Corp. v. Immunomedics, Inc. 877 F. Supp. 202, 207 (D.N.J. 1994). 
99 Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir. 2003), vacated by 125 S. Ct. 
2372 (2005).  See also Mueller, supra note 17, at 947-61 (for an in-depth analysis of the experimental use 
defense in the Integra decision). 
100 Integra, 331 F.3d at 867. 
101 Id. at 866. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. at 866-67. 
104 Id. at 867. Presumably the use of the word ‘drug’ in the court’s holding is not restrictive given its 
concessions to the broader subject matter of Eli Lilly. 
105 Integra, 331 F.3d at 867. 
106 Id. at 877. 
107 Id. at 876. 
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inventions with the aim of improving them, finding new uses for them, or designing 
around them.108  Drawing a distinction between research and development, Judge 
Newman reasoned that research with a patented invention will fall within the exemption 
while research on an invention (development and commercialisation) will not.109  The 
fact that profit might be the ultimate goal or hope should not disqualify the activity.110  
The Judge concluded that it would be illogical if the initial exploratory phases of Merck’s 
research were covered by the common law exemption and the final regulatory stages by 
the statutory exemption, and yet activity in the intervening stages was infringing.111  If 
this were the case, the “infringement gap” in the middle of the research process would 
defeat the purposes of both the statutory and common law exemptions.112 
¶44 The problem with Judge Newman’s reasoning is that it is made without reference to 
Madey.113  Identification of drug candidates is part of the routine business of a company 
such as Merck and it is therefore doubtful whether the common law research exemption 
would cover this use.  If that is the case, then no gap exists and licenses are required for 
all the preparatory stages leading up to the statutory exemption. 
III. THE EXPERIMENTAL USE EXEMPTION IN JAPANESE LAW114 
¶45 Japan has a statutory experimental use exemption in Article 69(1) of its patent law.  
This provision provides as follows: “The effects of the patent right shall not extend to the 
working of the patent right for the purposes of experiment or research.”115 
¶46 The rationale underlying the exemption was understood to be the advancement of 
technology, and in one of the earliest decisions interpreting this section, research or 
experiments for commercial use were therefore excluded from the exemption.116  
Similarly, experiments conducted for the purposes of gaining regulatory approval were 
not considered to advance technology.117  Five judicial decisions in 1996 reinforced this 
interpretation of section 69(1) by holding that section 69 did not apply to generic 
manufacturing and production for the purpose of obtaining regulatory approval during the 
subsistence of an existing patent.118 
¶47 Two subsequent decisions rejected this line of reasoning.  In Wellcome Foundation 
Ltd v. Sawai Pharmaceutical,119 the Tokyo District Court had to determine whether 
Sawai, a Japanese pharmaceutical company, had infringed Wellcome’s patent by 
 
108 Id. at 876-77. 
109 Id. 
110 Id. at 876-77. 
111 Integra, 331 F.3d at 867-77. 
112 Id. at 877. 
113 Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
114 Unlike the United States, Japan has a civil law system in which judicial decisions do not form 
binding law, as they do in the United States system.  However, judicial decisions in Japan are indicative of 
the way in which a statutory provision should be interpreted.  Johnson, supra note 3, at 511. 
115 Tokkyo ho [Patent Law], Law No. 121 of 1951, art. 69, no. 1. 
116 Tessensohn, supra note 1, at 25 (citing Monsanto Co. v Stauffer Japan K.K.,1246 Hanrei Jiho 128 
(Tokyo Dist. Ct. 1987)).  See also Johnson, supra note 3, at 512-13. 
117 Tessensohn, supra note 1, at 25-26. 
118 Tessensohn, supra note 1, at 26-27; Johnson, supra note 3, at 513-16. 
119 Tessensohn, supra note 1, at 6. 
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applying for manufacturing approval and conducting tests and research on drugs similar 
to Wellcome’s patented drug during the subsistence of the Wellcome patent.120  The court 
found that Sawai’s research was aimed at achieving technical progress in terms of Article 
69(1).121  Sawai did not earn any direct profit from these activities, nor did it compete in 
the same economic market as Wellcome.122  However, activities directed towards 
manufacturing or selling the product before the expiration of the patent would fall outside 
of section 69(1).123 
¶48 In Daiichi Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd v. Shiono Chemical K.K.,124 the Tokyo District 
Court emphasized the incentive to innovate justification of patent law and the policy 
purposes underlying section 69(1), namely to strike a balance between the interests of the 
patentee and the general public and to allow for the improvement of technology and the 
development of industry.125  The court held that section 69(1) is not limited to 
experiments or research directed at working improvements to existing technology.126  The 
court held that if generic drug manufacturers were required to wait until the expiration of 
the patent on the brand name drug before they were permitted to undertake the tests and 
manufacturing necessary to secure regulatory approval, this would grant the patent holder 
a de facto period of market exclusivity beyond the end of the patent term.127  This, the 
court held, is contrary to the very purposes of the patent regime.128  As in the Wellcome 
case, the court noted that Shiono did not obtain any profits from these activities nor did it 
compete with Daiichi during the subsistence of the patent.129 
¶49 The change in direction by the courts seems to have stemmed primarily from two 
factors.  First, in addition to benefiting from a statutory patent term extension scheme,130 
pharmaceutical manufacturers were obtaining a de facto term extension of three years due 
to the regulatory delay faced by the generic drug manufacturers.  Second, the generic 
drug manufacturers relied on the research exemptions of the US and the EU to 
demonstrate that Japanese patent law was out of line with the other major pharmaceutical 
manufacturing jurisdictions.131 
¶50 In Ono Pharmaceutical v. Malco Pharmaceutical K.K., however, the Nagoya 
District Court decided differently than the Tokyo District Court in Wellcome and Daiichi.  
The Nagoya court found that clinical tests conducted solely for the purposes of obtaining 
regulatory approval amounted to patent infringement.132  However, the court refused to 
 
120 Tessensohn, supra note 1, at 7; Johnson, supra note 3, at 513-16. 
121 Id. 
122 Tessensohn, supra note 1, at 8; Johnson, supra note 3, at 513-16. 
123 Id. 
124 Tessensohn, supra note 1, at 9; Johnson, supra note 3, at 513-16. 
125 Tessensohn, supra note 1, at 13-14. 
126 Id. at 14. 
127 Id. at 16. 
128 Id. at 31.  See, e.g., Tokkyo ho [Patent Law], Law No. 121 of 1951, art. 1. (stating that: “The purpose 
of this Law shall be to encourage inventions by promoting their protection and utilization so as to 
contribute to the development of industry.”). 
129 Tessensohn, supra note 1, at 17.  See also the Kyorin and Ono cases described by Tessensohn which 
were decided in favour of generic drug manufacturers on grounds other than section 69. 
130 Id. at 29-30. 
131 Id. at 29. 
132 Id. at 20-21. 
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grant a preliminary injunction against the generic manufacturer and instead granted 
compensation for damages.133 
¶51 The Japanese Supreme Court has aligned itself with the Tokyo District Court 
decisions and has held that the use of a patented invention for the purpose of obtaining a 
licence to market the generic equivalent of a patented medicine will fall within the scope 
of the statutory exemption.134 
¶52 Tessensohn has argued that, given the Japanese courts’ concern with the promotion 
of the public interest, any non-regulatory research activity would probably not fall within 
section 69 as non-regulatory research activities would not promote any general public 
interest.  This view is probably too narrow.  Hanabusa states that experiments and 
research activities not typically aimed at commercial profit, performed with the purpose 
of contributing to progress and development, and not infringing on the interests of the 
patentee will fall within section 69.135  It is also important to realize that unlike the 
United States exemption, the Japanese exemption is not limited to drugs and medical 
devices but applies to all patented products.136 
IV. THE EXPERIMENTAL USE EXEMPTION IN U.K. LAW 
¶53 Section 60 of the U.K. Patents Act defines direct and indirect infringement of 
patent rights and provides for certain exemptions from infringement.137  Section 60(5) 
states that “[a]n act which, apart from this subsection, would constitute an infringement 
of a patent for an invention shall not do so if – (a) it is done privately and for purposes 
which are not commercial; (b) it is done for experimental purposes relating to the subject 
matter of the invention.”138  Section 130(7) specifies that section 60 should have the same 
effects in the UK, so far as is practicable, as the European Patent Convention,  the 
Community Patent Convention and the Patent Cooperation Treaty each have in their 
respective areas of operation.139 
¶54 There are very few cases interpreting these provisions.140  In Monsanto Co. v 
Stauffer Chemical Co.,141 the defendant sought to rely on section 60(5) of the Patent Act 
to carry out field trials with an allegedly infringing pesticide product that was already the 
subject of an injunction restraining the defendant from further use or sale of the 
pesticide.142  The court denied the application and held that the exemption was limited to: 
experiments directed to the patented invention as such, experiments such 
as testing whether a patented product can be made, or a patented article 
 
133 Id. 
134 Derzko, supra note 2, at 63 (citing Otsuka Pharm. Co., Ltd. v. Towa Yakuhin K.K., Japanese 
Supreme Court).  See also Johnson, supra note 3, at 510-11. 
135 MASAMI HANABUSA, AN ANALYSIS OF JAPANESE PATENT LAW 196-97 (Tsuneo Hanabusa trans., 
Brunswick Publishing 1992). 
136 Johnson, supra note 3, at 511. 
137 Derzko, supra note 2, at 50-51 (citing PATENTS ACT § 60 (1977)). 
138 Id. 
139 Derzko, supra note 2, at 50-51 (citing PATENTS ACT § 130 (1977)). 
140 ACIP, supra note 4, at 41. 
141 [1985] R.P.C. 515. 
142 Id. 
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made to work, as described in the patent specification, or experiments to 
see whether the patented invention can be improved or testing the effect of 
a modification in some particular [way] to see whether it is an 
improvement or not.143  
¶55 The court held that the exemption did not extend to using a patented product or 
process for testing or evaluating some other product or process, nor did the exemption 
apply to achieving or extending the acceptance of some commercial embodiment of the 
patented invention.144  Such experiments are disqualified because they do not relate to the 
subject matter of the patented invention.145 
¶56 This interpretation of section 60(5) was upheld on appeal.146  The appeals court 
recognized, as did Judge Newman in Integra, that all activities of companies would have 
commercial ends in view and that this alone did not defeat the experimental use 
exemption.147  In the court’s example, an experiment limited to determining capacity to 
manufacture a quality product commercially in accordance with the patent specifications 
would be covered by the exemption.148  The court limited the scope of the experimental 
use exemption by defining the word “experiment” to mean “trials carried out in order to 
discover something unknown or to test a hypothesis.”149  This includes tests to determine 
whether something known to work under particular conditions also works under other 
conditions.150  Tests conducted in order to amass information or to demonstrate that a 
product or process works as claimed do not qualify as experiments under section 60(5).151  
The court recognized that the purpose of a trial may be difficult to determine or may have 
a mixed purpose, and held that it was for the courts to determine the purpose of the 
activity on the basis of the evidence led by the defendant.152  Generally, where the use of 
a trial is mixed (part pure research part commercial use), English law favors a narrow 
approach that considers the use to be infringing.153 
V. THE EXPERIMENTAL USE EXEMPTION IN GERMAN LAW 
¶57 The German experimental use provision, like the English statutory exemption, is 
modelled on the European Community Patent Convention.  In Klinische Versuche I,154 
the Federal Supreme Court of Germany rejected the prior jurisprudence on experimental 
use,155 holding that the meaning and scope of the experimental use privilege should be 
 
143 Id. at 522. 
144 Id. 
145 Id. 
146 Monsanto Co. v. Stauffer Chemical Co. & Another, [1985] R.P.C. 515. 
147 Id. 
148 Id. at 538. 
149 Id. at 542. 
150 Id. 
151 Id. 
152 Monsanto Co. v. Stauffer Chemical Co., [1985] R.P.C. 515, 542. 
153 ACIP, supra note 4, at 41 (citing SK& F v. Evans [1989] F.S.R. 513, and McDonald v. Graham 
[1994] R.P.C. 515). 
154 Klinische Versuche (Clinical Trials) I, [1997] R.P.C. 623 (Fed. Sup. Ct. Germany). 
155 Tessensohn, supra note 1, at 54 (discussing Ethofumesat case). 
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interpreted in the light of the new EC Patent Convention.156  Specifically, the court found 
that using a patented polypeptide in tests to ascertain further medical uses for the patented 
product fell within the statutory experimental use exemption.157 
¶58 Like the English courts, the Federal Supreme Court held that Section 11 No. 2 of 
the Patents Act is concerned with the purpose of the act not the type of act that is taking 
place.158  The court gave a broad interpretation to the word “experiment,” holding that it 
includes any procedure for obtaining information irrespective of the intended use of the 
information, provided that the experiment relates to the subject matter of the invention.159  
Following this interpretation, any experiment directed at gaining information for 
scientific research into the subject matter of the invention is permitted as an experimental 
use.160  This includes use of the invention.161 
¶59 Importantly, the court held that because the statutory language contains neither 
quantitative nor qualitative limits on the experiments that may be performed, it does not 
matter whether the experiments are performed solely to verify statements made in the 
patent claim or to extract further unknown information.162  It also does not matter 
whether these experiments are employed for wider purposes such as commercial 
interests.163  Once the initial requirement of an experimental purpose is satisfied the 
exemption will be granted regardless of the way in which the results of the experiment 
are used.164  The Court’s interpretation was particularly informed by the view that further 
technical development is in the public interest and is the aim of patent law.165 
¶60 Klinische Versuche II also involved a patented genetically engineered polypeptide 
sequence.166  The defendant had generated the same patented sequences as the patent 
holder but had used a different procedure than the one employed by the patent holder.  
The defendant then used this sequence in clinical trials with three purposes: (1) 
verification of certain animal test results; (2) generation of data for obtaining official 
pharmaceutical permission to market the product; and (3) comparison of certain 
properties of the patented version against the defendant’s version.167  As in Klinische 
Versuche I, the Federal Supreme Court of Germany found that the defendant’s activities 
were covered by the statutory exemption.168 
¶61 The court accepted that these clinical experiments were carried out predominantly 
to obtain data for the regulatory pharmaceutical approval process.169  Relying on its 
interpretation in Klinische Versuche I the court held that: 
 
156 Klinische Versuche, [1997] R.P.C. 623, 625. 
157 Id. at 646. 
158 Id. at 638. 
159 Id. 
160 Id. at 639. 
161 Id. 
162 Klinische Versuche, [1997] R.P.C. 639. 
163 Id. 
164 Id. 
165 Id. at 643. 
166 Klinische Versuche (Clinical Trials) II, [1998] R.P.C. 423 (Fed. Sup. Ct. Germany). 
167 Id. at 423. 
168 Id. at 424. 
169 Id. at 432. 
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According to the wording of the law it does not make any difference 
whether the experiments supply scientifically or commercially usable 
results, or whether the test . . . achieves the aim of obtaining data for legal 
pharmaceutical permission, thus preparing the access to the market for 
after the expiration of the term of protection of the patent.170  
¶62 Because the Convention for the European Patent for the Common Market makes no 
mention of limits for experiments with commercial goals,171 the court held that 
commercial orientation will not “from the outset turn the commercial activity into an 
impermissible patent infringement.”172  Instead, as the British court did in Stauffer, the 
German court limited the range of permissible activities by defining what will and will 
not constitute an experiment.173  Experiments must relate to “technological theory” and 
should not be undertaken in such proportions as to no longer allow for justification on 
research grounds.174  Experiments carried out with the purpose of “persistently disturbing 
or hindering the inventor’s distribution of his product” will be impermissible.175  In 
essence, in accordance with the German view of patent law as being for the purpose of 
technological advancement, the purpose of the experiment must be technological 
progress rather than the accomplishment of competitive purposes.176  The court was 
aware of the economic reality that clinical research involving pharmaceuticals would 
almost invariably be based on commercial considerations because of the high costs of 
such R&D.177 
VI. A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE EXPERIMENTAL USE EXEMPTIONS 
¶63 Of the four countries surveyed, the U.S. is alone in failing to craft a general 
statutory research exemption beyond the industry specific Bolar exemption.  Amongst 
leading patent nations, a statutory exemption of this kind is the norm.178 
¶64 It is a common complaint in U.S. publications that the U.S. has a very narrow 
experimental use exemption.  It is important to realize that this is only true in one sense.  
With respect to the range of patented goods covered by the exemption, the U.S. 
exemption is narrow and covers only medical products.  Japan, Germany and the U.K. do 
not discriminate with respect to the subject matter of the patent.  With respect to the 
range of permissible activities on exempted goods, however, the U.S. has the broadest 
exemption.  Germany is next on the scale, permitting a certain amount of commercial 
use.  Although German law permits commercial uses of inventions under their 
experimental use exemption, the German exemption is narrower than the American 
 
170 Id. at 433. 
171 The Court implies that if the drafters wished to have created such limits they would have included 
them. 
172 Klinische Versuche (Clinical Trials) II, [1998] R.P.C. 423, 434 (Fed. Sup. Ct. Germany). 
173 Id. 
174 Id. at 436. 
175 Id. 
176 Id. 
177 Klinische Verusch II, [1998] R.P.C. 437. 
178 Mueller, supra note 17, at 969. 
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exemption in that German law will not permit the use of a patented invention for 
clarifying commercial facts such as price acceptance, distribution possibilities and market 
needs, as these issues are not related to the subject matter of the invention.179  Next on the 
scale are Japan and England which lie together near the narrow end of the spectrum and 
prohibit commercial activity.180 
¶65 As Strandburg’s analysis demonstrates, countries should be less concerned with 
providing experimental use exemptions for product patents and more concerned with 
process patents.  For product patents, the first-sale doctrine typically alleviates the need 
for an experimental use exemption,181 at least in respect of use.  None of the nations 
reviewed here have drawn any distinction between product patents and process patents. 
¶66 Several commentators have recognised Judge Newman’s distinction in Integra182 
between experimenting on and experimenting with as important, even perhaps 
determinative.183  The U.S. has not, however, adopted this distinction.  The German and 
English tests which require an experiment to relate to the subject matter of the invention 
are alternative formulations of the “experimenting on” and “experimenting with” 
distinction.  Commentators concede that there will be difficulties at the margins in 
distinguishing differences between experimenting on and experimenting with, but argue 
that this does not diminish the importance of the distinction.184 
VII. THE IMPACT OF EXPERIMENTAL USE EXEMPTION ON R&D  
¶67 Japanese pharmaceutical R&D lags behind that of both Europe and the U.S.185  
Between 1995 and 1998 Japan showed a decline in the number of new pharmaceutical 
products brought to market, with the number of new pharmaceutical products approved 
reaching the lowest number in ten years.186  In 1996, more than half of the new 
pharmaceuticals approved for sale on the Japanese market had foreign patent holders.187  
The number of pharmaceutical patents granted also showed a decline during this 
period.188 
¶68 In the overall patent statistics for the year 2000, U.S. residents held just slightly less 
than 35% of the patents in the triadic patent families, followed by Japan at just over 25%, 
Germany at 13% and the U.K. at 4%.189  They rank in the same order for gross domestic 
 
179 Derzko, 44 IDEA 1, supra note 2, at 59. 
180 See id. at 70-17. Derzko offers the same spectrum taking into account price control and patent term 
extension schemes.  Johnson, 12 Pac. Rim L. & Pol’y 499.  Johnson would classify Japan as broader than 
the U.S. because the Japanese exemption permits designing around a patent, which is blocked in the U.S. 
by the Embrex decision.  Embrex, however, relates to the exceedingly narrow common law exception and 
to the broad statutory exemption. 
181 Mueller, supra note 17, at 974. 
182 Integra, Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir. 2003), vacated by 125 
S. Ct. 2372 (2005). 
183 Mueller, supra note 17, at 956-57. 
184 Id. 




189 Compendium of Patent Statistics: 2004.  Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development 
(OECD) 15.  The triadic patent family represents those patents filed at the United States Patent Office, the 
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expenditure on R&D financed by industry190 and number of PCT applications filed.191  
However, if one measures the number of triadic patent families held over gross domestic 
product, Japan scores the highest at a ratio of 3.8, followed by Germany at 3.0, the U.S. at 
1.6 and the U.K. at 1.3192 
¶69 Since 1997, Japan has displayed an increasing number of triadic patent families per 
unit of industry-financed R&D, while the U.S. and Germany have both shown a marked 
decline.  The U.K. was stable from 1997 to 1999, after which it also showed a decline.193 
¶70 This seems to indicate that of the four nations, Japan is getting more innovative 
output per unit of R&D input than the other nations, and generates a greater proportion of 
national income from its innovative outputs than the other nations.  These findings are 
confirmed by results reported by Johnson indicating a growth of inventive activity in 
Japan, with Japan being predicted to outstrip the U.S. and all other nations in number of 
innovations per million residents.194 
¶71 The U.K. was the leader for patent applications to the EPO for domestic inventions 
owned by foreign residents, with slightly less than 40% of all the U.K.’s domestic patents 
being foreign-owned.  Germany scored 13%, the U.S. 12% and Japan 3%.195  For 
domestic ownership of inventions made abroad and filed at the EPO the U.K. again 
ranked first of the four countries with 19%, followed by the U.S. with 18%, Germany 
with 12% and Japan with 3%.196  These figures indicate that of the four nations, the U.K. 
is substantially more popular with foreign inventors.  On the other hand, the U.K. 
inventors do not go offshore to patent their inventions to any significantly greater degree 
than either Germans or Americans.  The Japanese are the least internationalized on both 
counts. 
¶72 On these figures it seems that fears about research exemptions driving R&D 
offshore may well be misplaced.  Although Japan showed a decline in its pharmaceutical 
industry as the courts began to favour generic manufacturers, the overall patent statistics 
do not show a move offshore by Japanese inventors and, in fact, indicate an increased 
innovative output. 
VIII. CONCLUSION  
¶73 This review of the patent statistics reveals that, contrary to predictions in the 
literature,197 a narrow experimental use exemption might not correlate with reduced 
 
European Patent Office, and the Japanese Patent Office. 
190 Id. at 24. 
191 Id. at 20.  38% of the applications in 2001 were filed by United States residents, 13% by Japanese 
residents, 13% by German residents, and 5% by United Kingdom residents. 
192 Id. at 22. 
193 Id. at 25. 
194 Johnson, supra note 3, at 531-32. 
195 ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 189, at 30. 
196 Id. at 31. 
197 Proposals by the European Union Parliament clearly equate experimental use provisions with 
increased competitiveness.  See Derzko, supra note 2, at 62; Tessensohn, supra note 1, at 38.  See also 
Sandstrom, supra note 3, who argues that countries with high innovative capacities all have broad 
experimental use exemptions in their law (citing Germany, Japan, Italy, Switzerland, France, Spain, 
Sweden, Canada and the United Kingdom).  Sandstrom’s analysis is based, however, on the presumption 
that the experimental use exemptions in these countries are broader than the exemption in the United States.  
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R&D.  Based on the figures presented here, there is also no evidence of a movement of 
R&D offshore.  Nor does a narrow experimental use exemption show evidence of 
reduced university research.198 
¶74 What also emerges from this analysis is that U.S. law is alone in founding its test 
exclusively on a distinction between commercial and non-commercial research.  This is a 
test that is bound to fail, as it does not take into account the economic and practical 
realities of research that have resulted in a blurring of the distinction between pure 
research and applied research.199  While the Japanese apply their commercial test based 
on the jurisprudential rationales underlying patent law,200 the American cases 
demonstrate the difficulty US courts have faced in trying to decide cases on the basis of a 
commercial analysis alone.  The Japanese cases illustrate a marked change in direction 
when the commercial analysis is supplemented with a grounding in the jurisprudential 
bases of patent law.  As Strandburg has demonstrated, the research exemption is 
intimately connected to the incentives to innovate theory, and to be successful any test 
implementing the research exemption must take that jurisprudence into account. 
¶75 It is also clear, as Eisenberg,201 Strandburg202 and Judge Newman in Integra 
noted,203 that a distinction must be drawn between experimenting with a patented 
invention and experimenting on a patented invention so as to protect the interests of the 
research tool patentee.204  The experimental use exemptions of German and English law 
incorporate this distinction by requiring an experiment to relate to the subject-matter of 
the invention.  In terms of the “incentive to innovate” theory, it makes sense to exclude 
research tools from any research exemption, as the German and English approaches 
attempt to do.205  Still, the distinction between experimenting on and experimenting with 
is not without its problems at the margins.  This is especially true in the software and 
biotechnology fields.206  However, even in these hard cases, the distinction has the clarity 
to operate as a meaningful test that is both factual and objective.207 
 
As this study has shown the experimental use exemptions in the United Kingdom, Germany and Japan are 
narrower than the US exemption.  In addition, the study that Sandstrom relies upon does not measure the 
actual R&D output of the nations concerned, but rather innovative capacity, or the potential for innovation, 
based on the way in which R&D is funded, organized and integrated with other industry sectors. 
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